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Abstract
Parody is a figurative device used to imitate
an entity for comedic or critical purposes and
represents a widespread phenomenon in so-
cial media through many popular parody ac-
counts. In this paper, we present the first com-
putational study of parody.We introduce a new
publicly available data set of tweets from real
politicians and their corresponding parody ac-
counts. We run a battery of supervised ma-
chine learning models for automatically de-
tecting parody tweets with an emphasis on ro-
bustness by testing on tweets from accounts
unseen in training, across different genders
and across countries. Our results show that po-
litical parody tweets can be predicted with an
accuracy up to 90%. Finally, we identify the
markers of parody through a linguistic analy-
sis. Beyond research in linguistics and politi-
cal communication, accurately and automati-
cally detecting parody is important to improv-
ing fact checking for journalists and analytics
such as sentiment analysis through filtering out
parodical utterances.1
1 Introduction
Parody is a figurative device which is used to im-
itate and ridicule a particular target (Rose, 1993)
and has been studied in linguistics as a figura-
tive trope distinct to irony and satire (Kreuz and
Roberts, 1993; Rossen-Knill and Henry, 1997).
Traditional forms of parody include editorial car-
toons, sketches or articles pretending to have been
authored by the parodied person.2 A new form
∗Equal contribution.
†Work was done while at the University of Sheffield.
1Data is available here: https://archive.org/de
tails/parody data acl20
2The ‘Kapou Opa’ column by K. Maniatis parodying
Greek popular persons was a source of inspiration for this
work - https://www.oneman.gr/originals/to
-imerologio-karantinas-tou-dimitri-kouts
oumpa/
of parody recently emerged in social media, and
Twitter in particular, through accounts that im-
personate public figures. Highfield (2016) defines
parody accounts acting as: a known, real person,
for obviously comedic purposes. There should be
no risk of mistaking their tweets for their subject’s
actual views; these accounts play with stereotypes
of these figures or juxtapose their public image
with a very different, behind-closed-doors per-
sona.
A very popular type of parody is political par-
ody which plays an important role in public speech
by offering irreverent interpretations of political
personas (Hariman, 2008). Table 1 shows exam-
ples of very popular (over 50k followers) and ac-
tive (thousands of tweets sent) political parody ac-
counts on Twitter. Sample tweets show how the
style and topic of parody tweets are similar to
those from the real accounts, which may pose is-
sues to automatic classification.
While closely related figurative devices such as
irony and sarcasm have been extensively studied
in computational linguistics (Wallace, 2015; Joshi
et al., 2017), parody yet to be explored using com-
putational methods. In this paper, we aim to bridge
this gap and conduct, for the first time, a system-
atic study of political parody as a figurative device
in social media. To this end, we make the follow-
ing contributions:
1. A novel classification task where we seek to au-
tomatically classify real and parody tweets. For
this task, we create a new large-scale publicly
available data set containing a total of 131,666
English tweets from 184 parody accounts and
corresponding real accounts of politicians from
the US, UK and other countries (Section 3);
2. Experiments with feature- and neural-based
machine learning models for parody detection,
which achieve high predictive accuracy of up
to 89.7% F1. These are focused on the robust-
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ness of classification, with test data from: a)
users; b) genders; c) locations; unseen in train-
ing (Section 5);
3. Linguistic analysis of the markers of parody
tweets and of the model errors (Section 6).
We argue that understanding the expression
and use of parody in natural language and au-
tomatically identifying it are important to appli-
cations in computational social science and be-
yond. Parody tweets can often be misinterpreted
as facts even though Twitter only allows parody
accounts if they are explicitly marked as parody3
and the poster does not have the intention to mis-
lead. For example, the Speaker of the US House
of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, falsely cited a
Michael Flynn parody tweet;4 and many users
were fooled by a Donald Trump parody tweet
about ‘Dow Joans’.5 Thus, accurate parody clas-
sification methods can be useful in downstream
NLP applications such as automatic fact check-
ing (Vlachos and Riedel, 2014) and rumour verifi-
cation (Karmakharm et al., 2019), sentiment anal-
ysis (Pang et al., 2008) or nowcasting voting inten-
tion (Tumasjan et al., 2010; Lampos et al., 2013;
Tsakalidis et al., 2018).
Beyond NLP, parody detection can be used in:
(i) political communication, to study and under-
stand the effects of political parody in the pub-
lic speech on a large scale (Hariman, 2008; High-
field, 2016); (ii) linguistics, to identify characteris-
tics of figurative language (Rose, 1993; Kreuz and
Roberts, 1993; Rossen-Knill and Henry, 1997);
(iii) network science, to identify the adoption and
diffusion mechanisms of parody (Vosoughi et al.,
2018).
2 Related Work
Parody in Linguistics Parody is an artistic
form and literary genre that dates back to Aristo-
phanes in ancient Greece who parodied argumen-
tation styles in Frogs. Verbal parody was studied
in linguistics as a figurative trope distinct to irony
and satire (Kreuz and Roberts, 1993; Rossen-Knill
and Henry, 1997) and researchers long debated its
definition and theoretic distinctions to other types
of humor (Grice et al., 1975; Sperber, 1984; Wil-
son, 2006; Dynel, 2014). In general, verbal parody
3Both the profile description and account name need to
mention this – https://help.twitter.com/en/ru
les-and-policies/parody-account-policy
4https://tinyurl.com/ybbrh74g
5https://tinyurl.com/s34dwgm
involves a highly situated, intentional, and conven-
tional speech act (Rossen-Knill and Henry, 1997)
composed of both a negative evaluation and a form
of pretense or echoic mention (Sperber, 1984;Wil-
son, 2006; Dynel, 2014) through which an entity
is mimicked or imitated with the goal of criticiz-
ing it to a comedic effect. Thus, imitative compo-
sition for amusing purpose is an an inherent char-
acteristic of parody (Franke, 1971). The parodist
intentionally re-presents the object of the parody
and flaunts this re-presentation (Rossen-Knill and
Henry, 1997).
Parody on Social Media Parody is considered
an integral part of Twitter (Vis, 2013) and previ-
ous studies on parody in social media focused on
analysing how these accounts contribute to topi-
cal discussions (Highfield, 2016) and the relation-
ship between identity, impersonation and authen-
ticity (Page, 2014). Public relation studies showed
that parody accounts impact organisations during
crises while they can become a threat to their rep-
utation (Wan et al., 2015).
Satire Most related to parody, satire has been
tangentially studied as one of several prediction
targets in NLP in the context of identifying disin-
formation (McHardy et al., 2019; de Morais et al.,
2019). (Rashkin et al., 2017) compare the lan-
guage of real news with that of satire, hoaxes, and
propaganda to identify linguistic features of unre-
liable text. They demonstrate how stylistic charac-
teristics can help to decide the text’s veracity. The
study of parody is therefore relevant to this topic,
as satire and parodies are classified by some as a
type of disinformation with ‘no intention to cause
harm but has potential to fool’ (Wardle and Der-
akhshan, 2018).
Irony and Sarcasm There is a rich body of
work in NLP on identifying irony and sarcasm as
a classification task (Wallace, 2015; Joshi et al.,
2017). Van Hee et al. (2018) organized two open
shared tasks. The first aims to automatically clas-
sify tweets as ironic or not, and the second is on
identifying the type of irony expressed in tweets.
However, the definition of irony is usually ‘a trope
whose actual meaning differs from what is lit-
erally enunciated’ (Van Hee et al., 2018), fol-
lowing the Gricean belief that the hallmark of
irony is to communicate the opposite of the lit-
eral meaning (Wilson, 2006), violating the first
maxim of Quality (Grice et al., 1975). In this
Account type Twitter Handle Sample tweet
Real @realDonaldTrump
The Republican Party, and me, had a GREAT day yesterday with respect to
the phony Impeachment Hoax, & yet, when I got home to the White House &
checked out the news coverage on much of television, you would have no idea
they were reporting on the same event. FAKE & CORRUPT NEWS!
Parody @realDonaldTrFan
Lies! Kampala Harris says my crimes are committed in plane site! Shes lying!
My crimes are ALWAYS hidden! ALWAYS!!
Real @BorisJohnson
Our NHS will never be on the table for any trade negotiations. Were invest-
ing more than ever before - and when we leave the EU, we will introduce an
Australian style, points-based immigration system so the NHS can plan for the
future.
Parody @BorisJohnson MP
People seem to be ignoring the many advantages of selling off the NHS, like
the fact that hospitals will be far more spacious once poor people can’t afford to
use them.
Table 1: Two examples of Twitter accounts of politicians and their corresponding parody account with a sample
tweet from each.
sense, irony is treated in NLP in a similar way
as sarcasm (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez et al., 2011; Khattri
et al., 2015; Joshi et al., 2017). In addition to the
words in the utterance, further using the user and
pragmatic context is known to be informative for
irony or sarcasm detection in NLP (Bamman and
Smith, 2015; Wallace, 2015). For instance, Oprea
and Magdy (2019) make use of user embeddings
for textual sarcasm detection. In the design of our
data splits, we aim to limit the contribution of this
aspects from the results.
Relation to other NLP Tasks The pretense as-
pect of parody relates our task to a few other NLP
tasks. In authorship attribution, the goal is to pre-
dict the author of a given text (Stamatatos, 2009;
Juola et al., 2008; Koppel et al., 2009). However,
there is no intent for the authors to imitate the style
of others and most differences between authors are
in the topics they write about, which we aim to
limit by focusing on political parody. Further, in
our setups, no tweets from an author are in both
training and testing to limit the impact of terms
specific to a particular person.
Pastiche detection (Dinu et al., 2012) aims to
distinguish between an original text and a text
written by someone aiming to imitate the style of
the original author with the goal of impersonat-
ing. Most similar in experimental setup to our task,
Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Devlin Marier (2019) aim to
distinguish between tweets published from the
same account by different types of users: politi-
cians or their staff. While both pastiches and staff
writers aim to present similar content with simi-
lar style to the original authors, the texts lack the
humorous component specific of parodies.
A large body of related NLP work has ex-
plored the inference of user characteristics. Past
research studied predicting the type of a Twitter
account, most frequently between individual or or-
ganizational, using linguistic features (De Choud-
hury et al., 2012; McCorriston et al., 2015;
Mac Kim et al., 2017). A broad literature has
been devoted to predicting personal traits from
language use on Twitter, such as gender (Burger
et al., 2011), age (Nguyen et al., 2011), ge-
olocation (Cheng et al., 2010), political prefer-
ence (Volkova et al., 2014; Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al.,
2017), income (Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al., 2015; Ale-
tras and Chamberlain, 2018), impact (Lampos
et al., 2014), socio-economic status (Lampos et al.,
2016), race (Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Ungar, 2018) or
personality (Schwartz et al., 2013; Preot¸iuc-Pietro
et al., 2016).
3 Task & Data
We define parody detection in social media as a
binary classification task performed at the social
media post level. Given a post T , defined as a se-
quence of tokens T = {t1, ..., tn}, the aim is to
label T either as parody or genuine. Note that one
could use social network information but this is
out of the paper’s scope as we only focus on par-
ody as a linguistic device.
We create a new publicly available data set to
study this task, as no other data set is available.
We perform our analysis on a set of users from the
same domain (politics) to limit variations caused
by topic. We first identify real and parody accounts
of politicians on Twitter posting in English from
the United States of America (US), the United
Kingdom (UK) and other accounts posting in En-
glish from the rest of the world. We opted to use
Twitter because it is arguably the most popular
platform for politicians to interact with the public
or with other politicians (Parmelee and Bichard,
2011). For example, 67% of prospective parlia-
mentary candidates for the 2019 UK general elec-
tion have an active Twitter account.6 Twitter also
allows to maintain parody accounts, subject to
adding explicit markers in both the user bio and
handle such as parody, fake.7 Finally, we label
tweets as parody or real, depending on the type of
account they were posted from. We highlight that
we are not using user description or handle names
in prediction, as this would make the task trivial.
3.1 Collecting Real and Parody Politician
Accounts
We first query the public Twitter API using
the following terms: {parody, #parody,
parody account, fake, #fake, fake
account, not real} to retrieve candidate
parody accounts according to Twitter’s policy.
From that set, we exclude any accounts matching
fan or commentary in their bio or account
name since these are likely to be not posting
parodical content. We also exclude private and
deactivated accounts and accounts with a majority
of non-English tweets.
After collecting this initial set of parody candi-
dates, the authors of the paper manually inspected
up to the first ten original tweets from each can-
didate to identify whether an account is a par-
ody or not following the definition of a public
figure parody account from Highfield (2016) (see
Section 1), further filtering out non-parody ac-
counts. We keep a single parody account in case of
multiple parody accounts about the same person.
Finally, for each remaining account, the authors
manually identified the corresponding real politi-
cian account to collect pairs of real and parody.
Following the process above, we were able to
identify parody accounts of 103 unique people,
with 81 having a corresponding real account. The
authors also identified the binary gender and loca-
tion (country) of the accounts using publicly avail-
able records. This resulted in 21.6% female ac-
counts (women parliamentarians percentages as of
2017: 19% US, 30% UK, 28.8% OECD average).8
6https://www.mpsontwitter.co.uk/
7https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-an
d-policies/parody-account-policy
8https://data.oecd.org/inequality/wom
en-in-politics.htm
Person
Train Dev Test Total
Avg. tokens
(Train)
Real 51,460 6,164 8,086 65,710 23.33
Parody 51,706 6,164 8,086 65,956 20.15
All 103,166 12,328 16,172 131,666 22.55
Table 2: Data set statistics with the person split.
The majority of the politicians are located in the
US (44.5%) followed by the UK (26.7%) while
28.8% are from the rest of the world (e.g. Ger-
many, Canada, India, Russia).
3.2 Collecting Real and Parody Tweets
We collect all of the available original tweets, ex-
cluding retweets and quoted tweets, from all the
parody and real politician accounts.9 We further
balance the number of tweets in a real – parody
account pair in order for our experiments and lin-
guistic analysis not to be driven by a few prolific
users or by imbalances in the tweet ratio for a spe-
cific pair. We keep a ratio of maximum ±20%
between the real and parody tweets per pair by
keeping all tweets from the less prolific account
and randomly down-sampling from the more pro-
lific one. Subsequently, for the parody accounts
with no corresponding real account, we sample
a number of tweets equal to the median number
of tweets for the real accounts. Finally, we label
tweets as parody or real, depending on the type of
account they come from. In total, the data set con-
tains 131,666 tweets, with 65,710 real and 65,956
parody.
3.3 Data Splits
To test that automatically predicting political par-
ody is robust and generalizes to held-out situations
not included in the training data, we create the fol-
lowing three data splits for running experiments:
Person Split We first split the data by adding
all tweets from each real – parody account pair
to a single split, either train, development or test.
To obtain a fairly balanced data set without pairs
of accounts with a large number of tweets domi-
nating any splits, we compute the mean between
real and parody tweets for each account, and strat-
ify them, with pairs of proportionally distributed
means across the train, development, and test sets
(see Table 2).
9Up to maximum 3200 tweets/account according to Twit-
ter API restrictions.
Gender
Trained on Real Parody Total
Female
Train 10,081 11,036 21,117
Dev 302 230 532
Test (Male) 55,327 54,690 110,017
Male
Train 51,048 50,184 101,232
Dev 4,279 4,506 8,785
Test (Female) 10,383 11,266 21,649
Table 3: Data set statistics with the gender split (Male,
Female).
Location
Trained on Real Parody Total
US & RoW
Train 47,018 45,005 92,023
Dev 1,030 2,190 3,220
Test (UK) 17,662 18,761 36,423
UK & RoW
Train 33,687 35,371 69,058
Dev 1,030 1,274 2,304
Test (US) 30,993 29,311 60,304
US & UK
Train 43,211 42,597 85,808
Dev 5,444 5,475 10,919
Test (RoW) 17,055 17,884 34,939
Table 4: Data set statistics with the location split (US,
UK, Rest of the World–RoW).
Gender Split We also split the data by the gen-
der of the politicians into training, development
and test, obtaining two versions of the data: (i) one
with female accounts in train/dev and male in test;
and (ii) male accounts in train/dev and female in
test (see Table 3).
Location split Finally, we split the data based
on the location of the politicians. We group the ac-
counts in three groups of locations: US, UK and
the rest of the world (RoW). We obtain three dif-
ferent splits, where each group makes up the test
set and the other two groups make up the train and
development set (see Table 4).
3.4 Text Preprocessing
We preprocess text by lower-casing, replacing all
URLs and anonymizing all mentions of usernames
with placeholder token. We preserve emoticons
and punctuation marks and replace tokens that ap-
pear in less than five tweets with a special ‘un-
known’ token. We tokenize text using DLATK
(Schwartz et al., 2017), a Twitter-aware tokenizer.
4 Predictive Models
We experiment with a series of approaches to
classification of parody tweets, ranging from lin-
ear models, neural network architectures and pre-
trained contextual embedding models. Hyperpa-
rameter selection is included in the Appendix.
4.1 Linear Baselines
LR-BOW As a first baseline, we use a logistic
regression with standard bag-of-words (LR-BOW)
representation of the tweets.
LR-BOW+POS We extend LR-BOW using
syntactic information from Part-Of-Speech (POS)
tags. We first tag all tweets in our data using the
NLTK tagger and then we extract bag-of-words
features where each unigram consists of a token
with its associated POS tag.
4.2 BiLSTM-Att
The first neural model is a bidirectional Long-
Short Term Memory (LSTM) network (Hochre-
iter and Schmidhuber, 1997) with a self-attention
mechanism (BiLSTM-Att; Zhou et al. (2016)). To-
kens ti in a given tweet T = {t1, ..., tn} are
mapped to embeddings and passed through a bidi-
rectional LSTM. A single tweet representation (h)
is computed as the sum of the resulting contex-
tualized vector representations (
∑
i
aihi) where ai
is the self-attention score in timestep i. The tweet
representation (h) is subsequently passed to the
output layer using a sigmoid activation function.
4.3 ULMFit
The Universal Language Model Fine-tuning
(ULMFit) is a method for efficient transfer learn-
ing (Howard and Ruder, 2018). The key intuition
is to train a text encoder on a language mod-
elling task (i.e. predicting the next token in a se-
quence) where data is abundant, then fine-tune it
on a target task where data is more limited. During
fine-tuning, ULMFit uses gradual layer unfreez-
ing to avoid catastrophic forgetting. We experi-
ment with using AWD-LSTM (Merity et al., 2018)
as the base text encoder pretrained on the Wiki-
text 103 data set and we fine-tune it on our own
parody classification task. For this purpose, after
the AWS-LSTM layers, we add a fully-connected
layer with a ReLU activation function followed by
an output layer with a sigmoid activation function.
Before each of these two additional layers, we per-
form batch normalization.
4.4 BERT and RoBERTa
Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT) is a language model based
on transformer networks (Vaswani et al., 2017)
pre-trained on large corpora (Devlin et al., 2019).
The model makes use of multiple multi-head
attention layers to learn bidirectional embeddings
for input tokens. It is trained for masked language
modelling, where a fraction of the input tokens
in a given sequence are masked and the task is to
predict a masked word given its context. BERT
uses wordpieces which are passed through an
embedding layer and get summed together with
positional and segment embeddings. The former
introduce positional information to the attention
layers, while the latter contain information about
the location of a segment. Similar to ULMFit,
we fine-tune the BERT-base model for predicting
parody tweets by adding an output dense layer
for binary classification and feeding it with the
‘classification’ token.
We further experiment with RoBERTa (Liu
et al., 2019), which is an extenstion of BERT
trained on more data and different hyperparame-
ters. RoBERTa has been showed to improve per-
formance in various benchmarks compared to the
original BERT (Liu et al., 2019).
4.5 XLNet
XLNet is another pre-trained neural language
model based on transformer networks (Yang et al.,
2019). XLNet is similar to BERT in its struc-
ture, but is trained on a permutated (instead of
masked) language modelling task. During train-
ing, sentence words are permuted and the model
predicts a word given the shuffled context. We
also adapt XLNet for predicting parody, similar to
BERT and ULMFit.
4.6 Model Hyperparameters
We optimize all model parameters on the develop-
ment set for each data split (see Section 3).
Linear models For the LR-BOW, we use n-
grams with n = (1, 2), n ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3)
weighted by TF.IDF. For the LR-BOW+POS, we
use TF with POS n-grams where n = (1, 3). For
both baselines we use L2 regularization.
BiLSTM-Att We use 200-dimensional GloVe
embeddings (Pennington et al., 2014) pre-trained
on Twitter data. The maximum sequence length
is set to 50 covering 95% of the tweets in the
training set. The LSTM size is h = 300 where
h ∈ {50, 100, 300} with dropout d = 0.5 where
d ∈ {.2, .5}. We use Adam (Kingma and Ba,
2014) with default learning rate, minimizing the
binary cross-entropy using a batch size of 64 over
10 epochs with early stopping.
ULMFit We first update only the AWD-LSTM
weights with a learning rate l = 2e-3 for one epoch
where l ∈ {1e-3, 2e-3, 4e-3} for language mod-
eling. Then, we update both the AWD-LSTM and
embedding weights for one more epoch, using a
learning rate of l = 2e-5 where l ∈ {1e-4, 2e-5, 5e-
5}. The size of the intermediate fully-connected
layer (after AWD-LSTM and before the output) is
set by default to 50. Both in the intermediate and
output layers we use default dropout of 0.08 and
0.1 respectively from Howard and Ruder (2018).
BERT and RoBERTa For BERT, we used the
base model (12 layers and 110M total parameters)
trained on lowercase English. We fine-tune it for 1
epoch with a learning rate l = 5e-5 where l ∈ {2e-
5, 3e-5, 5e-5} as recommended in Devlin et al.
(2019) with a batch size of 128. For RoBERTa,
we use the same fine-tuning parameters as BERT.
XLNet We use the same parameters as BERT
except for the learning rate, which we set at l =
4e-5 where l ∈ {2e-5, 4e-5, 5e-5}.
5 Results
This section contains the experimental results ob-
tained on all three different data splits proposed in
Section 3.We evaluate our methods (Section 4) us-
ing several metrics, including accuracy, precision,
recall, macro F1 score, and Area under the ROC
(AUC). We report results over three runs using dif-
ferent random seeds and we report the average and
standard deviation.
5.1 Person Split
Table 5 presents the results for the parody pre-
diction models with the data split by person.
We observe the architectures using pre-trained
text encoders (i.e. ULMFit, BERT, RoBERTa and
XLNet) outperform both neural (BiLSTM-Att)
and feature-based (LR-BOW and LR-BOW+POS)
by a large margin across metrics with trans-
former architectures (BERT, RoBERTa and XL-
Net) performing best. The highest scoring model,
Person
Model Acc P R F1 AUC
LR-BOW 73.95 ±0.00 70.08 ± 0.01 83.53 ±0.02 76.19 ±0.00 73.96 ±0.00
LR-BOW+POS 74.33 ±0.00 71.34 ±0.00 81.19 ±0.00 75.95 ±0.00 74.34 ±0.00
BiLSTM-Att 79.92 ±0.01 81.63 ±0.01 77.11 ±0.03 79.29 ±0.02 79.91 ±0.01
ULMFit 81.11 ±0.38 75.57 ±2.03 84.97 ±0.87 81.05 ±0.42 81.10 ±0.38
BERT 87.65 ±0.29 87.63 ±0.58 87.67 ±0.40 87.65 ±0.18 87.65 ±0.32
RoBERTa 90.01 ±0.35 90.90 ±0.55 88.45 ±0.22 89.66 ±0.33 90.05 ±0.29
XLNet 86.45 ±0.41 88.24 ±0.52 85.18 ±0.40 86.68 ±0.37 86.45 ±0.36
Table 5: Accuracy (Acc), Precision (P), Recall (R), F1-Score (F1) and ROC-AUC for parody prediction splitting
by person (± std. dev.). Best results are in bold.
RoBERTa, classifies accounts (parody and real)
with an accuracy of 90, which is more than 8%
greater than the best non-transformer model (the
ULMFit method). RoBERTa also outperforms the
Logistic Regression baselines (LR-BOW and LR-
BOW+POS) by more than 16 in accuracy and 13
in F1 score. Furthermore, it is the only model to
score higher than 90 on precision.
5.2 Gender Split
Table 6 shows the F1-scores obtained when train-
ing on the gender splits, i.e. training on male and
testing on female accounts and vice versa. We first
observe that models trained on the male set are
in general more accurate than models trained on
the female set, with the sole exception of ULMFit.
This is probably due to the fact that the data set is
imbalanced towards men as shown in Table 3 (see
also Section 3). We also do not observe a dramatic
performance drop compared to the mixed-gender
model on the person split (see Table 5). Again,
RoBERTa is the most accurate model when trained
in both splits, obtaining an F1-score of 87.11 and
84.87 for the male and female data respectively.
The transformer-based architectures are again the
best performing models overall, but the difference
between them and the feature-based methods is
smaller than it was on the person split.
5.3 Location Split
Table 7 shows the F1-scores obtained training our
models on the location splits: (i) train/dev on UK
and RoW, test on US; (ii) train/dev on US and
RoW, test on UK; and (iii) train/dev on US and
UK, test on RoW. In general, the best results are
obtained by training on the US & UK split, while
results of the models trained on the RoW & US,
Gender
Model M→F F→M
LR-BOW 78.89 76.63
LR-BOW+POS 78.74 76.74
BiLSTM-Att 77.00 77.11
ULMFit 81.20 82.53
BERT 85.85 84.40
RoBERTa 87.11 84.87
XLNet 85.69 84.16
Table 6: F1-scores for parody prediction splitting by
gender (Male-M, Female-F). Best results are in bold.
Location
Model + → + → + →
LR-BOW 78.58 78.27 77.97
LR-BOW+POS 78.27 77.88 78.08
BiLSTM-Att 80.29 77.59 73.19
ULMFit 83.47 81.55 81.55
BERT 86.69 83.78 83.12
RoBERTa 87.70 85.10 85.99
XLNet 85.32 85.17 85.32
Table 7: F1-scores for parody prediction splitting by
location. Best results are in bold.
and RoW & UK splits are similar. The model with
the best performance trained on US & UK, and
RoW & UK splits is RoBERTa with F1 scores
of 87.70 and 85.99 respectively. XLNet performs
slightly better than RoBERTa when trained on
RoW & US data split.
5.4 Discussion
Through experiments over three different data
splits, we show that all models predict parody
tweets consistently above random, even if tested
on people unseen in training. In general, we ob-
serve that the pre-trained contextual embedding
based models perform best, with an average of
around 10 F1 better than the linear methods. From
these methods, we find that RoBERTa outperforms
the other methods by a small, but consistent mar-
gin, similar to past research (Liu et al., 2019). Fur-
ther, we see that the predictions are robust to any
location or gender specific differences, as the per-
formance on held-out locations and genders are
close to when splitting by person with a maximum
of < 5 F1 drop, also impacted by training on less
data (e.g. female users). This highlights the fact
that our models capture information beyond top-
ics or features specific to any person, gender or
location and can potentially identify stylistic dif-
ferences between parody and real tweets.
6 Analysis
We finally perform an analysis based on our novel
data set to uncover the peculiarities of political
parody and understand the limits of the predictive
models.
6.1 Linguistic Feature Analysis
We first analyse the linguistic features specific
of real and parody tweets. For this purpose, we
use the method introduced in (Schwartz et al.,
2013) and used in several other analyses of user
traits (Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al., 2017) or speech
acts (Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al., 2019). We thus rank
the feature sets described in Section 4 using uni-
variate Pearson correlation (note that for the anal-
ysis we use POS tags instead of POS n-grams).
Features are normalized to sum up to unit for each
tweet. Then, for each feature, we compute correla-
tions independently between its distribution across
posts and the label of the post (parody or not).
Table 8 presents the top unigrams and part-of-
speech features correlated with real and parody
tweets. We first note that the top features related to
either parody or genuine tweets are function words
or related to style, as opposed to the topic. This en-
forces that the make-up of the data set or any of its
categories are not impacted by topic choice and
parody detection is mostly a stylistic difference.
The only exception are a few hashtags related to
parody accounts (e.g. #imwithme), but on a closer
inspection, all of these are related to tweets from
a single parody account and are thus not useful in
prediction by any setup, as tweets containing these
Real Parody
Feature r Feature r
Unigrams
our 0.140 i 0.181
in 0.131 ? 0.156
and 0.129 <mention> 0.145
: 0.118 me 0.136
& 0.114 not 0.106
today 0.105 like 0.097
to 0.105 my 0.095
of 0.098 dude 0.094
the 0.091 don’t 0.090
at 0.087 i’m 0.087
lhl 0.086 just 0.083
great 0.085 know 0.081
with 0.084 #feeltheburp 0.078
de 0.079 you 0.076
meeting 0.078 #callmedick 0.075
for 0.077 #imwithme 0.073
across 0.073 ” 0.073
families 0.073 #visionzero 0.069
on 0.070 if 0.069
country 0.067 have 0.067
POS (Unigrams and Bigrams)
NN IN 0.1600 RB 0.1749
IN 0.1507 PRP 0.1546
CC 0.1309 RB VB 0.1271
IN JJ 0.1210 VBP 0.1206
NNS IN 0.1165 VBP RB 0.1123
NN CC 0.1114 . 0.1114
IN NN 0.1048 NNP NNP 0.1094
NN TO 0.1030 NN NNP 0.1057
NNS TO 0.1013 WRB 0.0925
TO 0.1001 VBP PRP 0.0904
CC JJ 0.0972 IN PRP 0.0890
IN DT 0.0941 NN VBP 0.0863
: JJ 0.0875 RB . 0.0854
NNS 0.0855 NNP 0.0837
: NN 0.0827 JJ VBP 0.0813
Table 8: Feature correlations with parody and real
tweets, sorted by Pearson correlation (r). All correla-
tions are significant at p < .01, two-tailed t-test.
will only appear in either the train or test set.
The top features related to either category of
tweets are pronouns (‘our’ for genuine tweets, ‘i’
for parody tweets). In general, we observe that par-
ody tweets are much more personal and include
possessives (‘me’, ‘my’, ‘i’, “i’m”, PRP) or sec-
ond person pronouns (‘you’). This indicates that
parodies are more personal and direct, which is
also supported by use of more @-mentions and
quotation marks. The real politician tweets are
more impersonal and the use of ‘our’ indicates a
desire to include the reader in the conversation.
The real politician tweets include more stop-
words (e.g. prepositions, conjunctions, determin-
ers), which indicate that these tweets are more
well formed. Conversely, the parody tweets in-
clude more contractions (“don’t”, “i’m”), hinting
to a less formal style (‘dude’). Politician tweets
frequently use their account to promote events
they participate in or are relevant to the day-to-
day schedule of a politician, as hinted by several
prepositions (‘at’, ‘on’) and words (‘meeting’, “to-
day’) (Preot¸iuc-Pietro and Devlin Marier, 2019).
For example, this is a tweet of the U.S. Senator
from Connecticut, Chris Murphy:
Rudy Giuliani is in Ukraine today, meeting with
Ukranian leaders on behalf of the President of
the United States, representing the President’s
re-election campaign.[...]
Through part-of-speech patterns, we observe
that parody accounts are more likely to use verbs
in the present singular (VBZ, VBP). This hints
that parody tweets explicitly try to mimic direct
quotes from the parodied politician in first person
and using present tense verbs, while actual politi-
cian tweets are more impersonal. Adverbs (RB)
are used predominantly in parodies and a com-
mon sequence in parody tweets is adverbs fol-
lowed by verbs (RB VB) which can be used to
emphasize actions or relevant events. For exam-
ple, the following is a tweet of a parody account
(@Queen Europe) of Angela Merkel:
I mean, the Brexit Express literally appears to be
going backwards but OK <url>
6.2 Error Analysis
Finally, we perform an error analysis to exam-
ine the behavior of our best performing model
(RoBERTa) and identify potential limitations of
the current approaches. The first example is a
tweet by the former US president Barack Obama
which was classified as parody while it is in fact a
real tweet:
Summer’s almost over, Senate Leaders. #doyour-
job <url>
Similarly, the next tweet was posted by the real
account of the Virginia governor, Ralph Northam:
At this point, the list of Virginians Ed Gillespie
*hasn’t* sold out is shorter than the folks he has.
<url>
Both of the tweets above contain humoristic ele-
ments and come off as confrontational, aimed at
someone else which is more prevalent in parody.
We hypothesize that the model picked up this in-
formation to classify these tweets as parody. From
the previous analyses, we noticed that tweets by
real politicians often convey information in a more
neutral or impersonal way. On the other hand, the
following tweet was posted by a Mitt Romney par-
ody account and was classified as real:
It’s up to you, America: do you want a repeat
of the last four years, or four years staggeringly
worse than the last four years?
This parody tweet, even though it is more opin-
ionated, is more similar in style to a slogan or
campaign speech and is therefore missclassified.
Lastly, the following is a tweet from former Presi-
dent Obama that was misclassified as parody:
It’s the #GimmeFive challenge, presidential
style. <url>
The reason behind is that there are politicians,
such as Barack Obama, who often write in an in-
formal manner and this may cause the models to
misclassify this kind of tweets.
7 Conclusion
We presented the first study of parody using
methods from computational linguistics and ma-
chine learning, a related but distinct linguistic phe-
nomenon to irony and sarcasm. Focusing on po-
litical parody in social media, we introduced a
freely available large-scale data set containing a
total of 131,666 English tweets from 184 real and
corresponding parody accounts. We defined par-
ody prediction as a new binary classification task
at a tweet level and evaluated a battery of feature-
based and neural models achieving high predictive
accuracy of up to 89.7% F1 on tweets from people
unseen in training.
In the future, we plan to study more in depth
the stylistic and figurative devices used for parody,
extend the data set beyond the political case study
and explore human behavior regarding parody, in-
cluding how this is detected and diffused through
social media.
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